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Abstract
In this essay, I will examine Broome’s argument in Weighing Goods (1991; sections 5.4 and 5.5) that aims to show that 
moderate Humeanism, according to which any coherent sets of preferences should be rationally acceptable, is not a sustain-
able view of decision theory. I will focus more specifically on the argument Broome uses to support his claim, and show that 
although it may get some traction, it does not undermine moderate Humeanism as we know it. After reconstructing Broome’s 
argument, I argue that standard decision theory supposes that the representation of a decision problem fully captures what 
is relevant to the agent, and therefore has nothing to say about the legitimacy of the representation in question. I argue that 
although Broome’s criticism does not jeopardize moderate Humeanism, it does pave the way for a new area of research in 
decision theory.
Keywords Decision theory · Rationality · Preferences · Framing · Individuation · Broome · Savage
1  Introduction and Motivation
1.1  Introduction and Reconstruction of Broome’s 
Argument
Standard decision theory provides an axiomatization of 
expected utility theory. Simply put, it shows that if an agent’s 
preferences respect a series of axioms, then she can be said 
to be acting as if maximizing an expected utility function. 
These axioms are then usually considered as normative 
axioms of rationality, some of them being fairly uncontro-
versial: transitivity of preferences is for instance widely 
accepted in the literature. Given this axiomatic framework, 
different normative approaches can be taken with respect to 
rationality. One of them is commonly known as moderate 
Humeanism, introduced by Hume, (1740, p. 267), and
“Tis not contrary to reason to prefer the destruction 
of the whole world to the scratching of my finger.’Tis 
not contrary to reason for me to chuse my total ruin, 
to prevent the least uneasiness of an Indian or person 
wholly unknown to me.’Tis as little contrary to reason 
to prefer even my own acknowledg’d lesser good to my 
greater, and have a more ardent affection for the former 
than the latter. In short, a passion must be accompani’d 
with some false judgement, in order to its being unrea-
sonable; and even then’tis not the passion, properly 
speaking, which is unreasonable, but the judgement.”
Moderate Humeanism thus claims that as long as some 
consistency constraints over judgments are respected, 
any desire-induced preferences should be acceptable: 
self-destructive preferences and cold-blooded pragma-
tism are just equally rational as long as they yield con-
sistent preferences. Under this view, the axioms laid 
out by standard decision theory are considered prima 
facie as tentative reasonable requirements of ration-
ality in that they capture intuitions of consistency as 
minimally as possible. Humeanism thus claims that 
all preferences, taken individually are rational; they 
only may not be so if they are not consistent with one 
another (or if the underlying desire is combined with 
a false belief). On the other hand, anti-Humeanism 
claims that there exist irrational preferences, even 
when considered in isolation. Although there is no 
uncontroversial indication of which classes of prefer-
ences are impermissible, as different theories push for 
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different ones, anti-Humeans believe that some addi-
tional constraints should be imposed on preferences 
beyond those of standard axioms.
In Weighing Goods (1991; section 5.4 and 5.5) Broome 
provides a new argument against moderate Humeanism. He 
argues that, if no additional constraint of rationality is added, 
an uncontroversial axiom such as transitivity becomes a 
vacuous requirement: it does not constrain preferences in 
any way; therefore, Broome argues, moderate Humeanism 
collapses into a fully permissive theory of rationality, that 
allows any set of preferences: Extreme Humeanism. Extreme 
Humeanism being widely unattractive, Broome has shown 
by appeal to a reductio strategy that anti-Humeanism is the 
only plausible position.
I this paper, I will focus on the specific argument Broome 
uses to show that moderate Humeanism collapses into its 
extreme counterpart. To understand this argument, let us 
first define more precisely the relationship between the tran-
sitivity constraint and the reindividuation strategy. Transi-
tivity imposes pairs of preferences to be consistent with 
one another: formally if O is the set of outcomes, then the 
consistency constraint demands that for all a, b in O (a < b 
b < c) → (a < c). To give an example, if John prefers tiramisu 
to panna cotta, and panna cotta to cannoli, then John needs 
to prefer tiramisu to cannoli in order to have transitive pref-
erences. Although this constraint is uncontroversial people 
may take issue with the way it applies to the objects of pref-
erences. One famous example was given by Sen (1993): sup-
pose you are invited to your friend’s house, and the latter 
lets you choose between two desserts, having the one you 
left for herself. Suppose that when offered an orange and a 
big apple you pick the big apple; when offered an orange 
and a small apple you pick the orange; and when offered a 
small and a big apple, out of politeness you pick the small 
one. Your pattern of preferences is then said to be cyclical 
(big apple > orange > small apple > big apple) and therefore 
intransitive. Sen’s objection consist in saying that this is 
not the way we should look at the outcomes, and that we 
should take into account politeness in their their description. 
Once correctly described your preferences are no longer 
intransitive, and your consistency is safe. This strategy of 
reindividuation of alternatives has been frequently used to 
explain and legitimately rationalize preferences that were 
prima facie deemed irrational. However, this is precisely this 
strategy that is under Broome’s scrutiny.
Broome’s argument can roughly be put as follows. Con-
sider Maurice, who prefers staying home when given the 
choice between staying home and going to Rome; who 
prefers going to Rome when given the choice between 
Rome and mountaineering, and who prefers mountain-
eering when given the choice between staying home and 
mountaineering. Maurice has allegedly intransitive and 
therefore irrational preferences. However, one could plau-
sibly argue that after all, Maurice’s preferences are not 
actually irrational since Maurice does not represent this 
situation through three but four alternatives: he distin-
guishes “mountaineering when given the choice between 
home and mountaineering” and “mountaineering when 
given the choice between Rome and mountaineering”. 
Maurice justifies this distinction by arguing that he would 
not want to look like a coward by refusing mountaineering 
and staying at home, while he would enjoy looking cul-
tured by choosing Rome over mountaineering. This rede-
scription of the alternatives is formally called reindividu-
ation of the outcomes: the set of outcomes is redescribed 
in a way that better captures the agent’s attitudes, and may 
make a difference for the decision making process.
More formally, Maurice’s alleged preferences in this case 
are intransitive: H > R > M > H, if {R, M, H} is the defined 
set of outcomes offered to Maurice, where R stands for 
“going to Rome”; M for “mountaineering” and H as “stay-
ing home”. One may want to redescribe the set of alterna-
tives as {R, M,  Hr,  Hm}; where  Hr stands for “staying home 
when offered to go to Rome” and  Hm for “staying home 
when offered to go mountaineering”. This reindividuation 
“rationalizes Maurice’s initial preferences” in the sense that 
it provides a redescription that makes his new preferences 
consistent:  Hr >’ R >’ M >’ Hm. We will call the first (respec-
tively second) set of outcomes O (O’), and the first prefer-
ence relation < (<’).
While Broome prima facie suspends his judgement as to 
whether Maurice has rational preferences, he contends that 
unconditionally allowing for reindividuation of alternatives 
gives rise to the “emptiness problem”: transitivity becomes 
an empty constraint, as any preferences over a set of out-
comes can always be rationalized by a finer reindividuation 
of these outcomes. “Where will it all end?”, he asks (Ibid, 
p. 101). Consequently, he argues that the only way to avoid 
this pitfall is to deny that any individuation of outcome is 
in general acceptable, and suggests two possible ways of 
doing so: the principle of individuation and the requirement 
of indifference. Being two distinct possible remedies, it does 
not matter if they are compatible or not. The principle of 
individuation claims that two outcomes are different if and 
only if they differ in a way that makes it rational to have a 
preference between them (which implies in Maurice’s case 
that  Hr and  Hm are identical outcomes). The requirement 
of indifference states that two individuated outcomes must 
rationally be equally desirable if there is no way in which it 
makes it rational for them not to be equally desired (which 
implies that  Hr and  Hm are different outcomes but that Mau-
rice should be indifferent between them). Although these 
principles are only two possible options to regulate pref-
erences and individuation, Broome argues that moderate 
Humeanism could not accommodate any of these principles, 
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as it would contradict the fact that any set of preferences is 
rational as long as they are consistent:
A Humean, on the other hand, cannot be happy with 
the conclusion that there must be rational principles 
of indifference. Such a principle denies that certain 
specific preferences are rational, which is something a 
Humean cannot allow. She cannot allow that rational-
ity should ever deny a person the right to prefer any-
thing to anything else, provided this preference is con-
sistent with her other preferences. (Broome 1993, p. 5)
Broome thus infers that moderate Humeanism must 
accept that consistency constraints such as transitivity can-
not apply to preferences. Consequently, moderate Humean-
ism is irreversibly exposed to the emptiness problem and 
collapses into Extreme Humeanism:
A Humean must therefore pay the penalty. She will 
have to accept that rationality does not constrain prac-
tical preferences. [...] How severe is this penalty? Does 
it completely undermine the position of a moderate 
Humean? An extreme Humean believes that rational-
ity allows a person to have any pattern of preferences 
whatsoever. Even a moderate Humean, we now see, 
has to believe that rationality allows a person to have 
any pattern of practical preferences whatsoever. [...] I 
conclude that the moderate Humean cannot sustain her 
position. She must either become extreme or cease to 
be a Humean. (Ibid, pp. 6–13)
To summarize this section, Broome’s argument can be 
reconstructed as follows:
 (i) Accepted claim: rational preferences are necessarily 
transitive.
 (ii) Counterexample to the claim: Maurice has rational 
and intransitive preferences < over O.
 (iii) But Maurice does not violate transitivity: we can 
reindividuate outcomes so that Maurice has non-
intransitive preferences <’ over the new outcomes 
in O’.
 (iv) However, the emptiness problem arises: if any indi-
viduation is allowed, transitivity becomes an empty 
constraint, which is unacceptable.
 (v) There are two ways of rationally constraining out-
come individuation: either individuation is not 
always licensed; or indifference between outcomes 
is sometimes required.
 (vi) But moderate Humeanism rejects both of these con-
straining strategies.
 (vii) Therefore, moderate Humeanism collapses into 
extreme Humeanism.
I have so far exposed Broome’s argument against 
Humeanism because of the “emptiness problem”. In the next 
section, I will introduce the notion of relevant representa-
tions, make a claim about it, and argue that premise (vi) of 
Broome’s reasoning is false.
1.2  Reindividuation and Representation: Literature 
Discussion
Besides Broome’s address of the normative status of reindi-
viduation strategies, few scholars have specifically discussed 
the issue. To the best of my knowledge, only two salient 
attempts have been made in this respect besides Broome’s: 
Dreier (1996) and Pettit (1991). Pettit comments the problem 
of individuation upon his analysis of decision theory’s ambi-
tion to be the “central sound core of psychology through ide-
alization”. He claims that “decision-theoretic probabilities 
and utilities which an agent would have under the idealized 
circumstances described in the relevance conditions are his 
beliefs and desires.” (Ibid). If successful, “decision theory 
explicates certain platitudes about belief, desire, preference 
and choice”. By contrast to Lewis (1983a), Pettit argues that 
this ambition is incompletely fulfilled, due to three main 
deficiencies. First, the author claims that decision theory 
is an incomplete account of the matters relevant to deci-
sion making, as it misses some of the elements that play a 
role in preference formation. In particular, he claims that 
by describing people’s choices with attitudes to prospects 
(e.g. the prospect of “eating an small apple” versus that of 
“eating an orange” in Sen’s example), it doesn’t explain how 
properties realized by these prospects play a motivational 
role for agents’ choices. As an example, suppose that John 
desires to go to the movie tonight and that this option would 
simultaneously disappoint his mother as she wants to spend 
time with him. The same prospect realizes two distinct prop-
erties that do not hold the same motivational content. This 
prospect is simultaneously desired and not desired by John. 
Yet claiming that the extensionality of preferences fails here 
would be misguided, because what truly drives our prefer-
ences are properties and not prospects according to Pettit. 
Based on this thesis, Pettit argues that decision theory is 
not an autonomous theory of rational idealized psychology, 
in that it needs some account of what identical outcomes 
are. Indeed, decision theory takes as inputs attitudes to 
outcomes (or prospects), without determining what counts 
as a such outcomes. Pettit goes on to say that the theory 
thus allows any individuation of outcomes. In other words, 
Pettit uses the problem of individuation to conclude that 
decision theory must depend on some principle of identifi-
cation of outcomes, and believes that this principle should 
resort on properties rather than prospects. Moreover, this 
property-based principle must lean on the practice of folk 
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psychology, confirming the initial claim that decision theory 
is non-autonomous.
Although it does refer to the problem of individuation, 
Pettit’s discussion is not centered on it as it only refers to 
it to bring forth his more general claims about the theory. 
More importantly, he does not discuss the logical compat-
ibility of moderate humeanism with what Broome calls the 
emptiness problem, which constitutes one of the main con-
cerns of this paper. Finally, I think that his conclusion that 
decision theory must rely on some folk psychology practice 
in order to solve the issue of individuation is not explicitly 
supported and therefore unconvincing. In this paper, I will 
in a way agree with Pettit on the incompleteness of the cur-
rent theory, but offer arguments in favor of a solution to the 
problem individuation that is both related and independent 
from decision theory. My suggested theory is related to deci-
sion theory, as it is still idealized, normative and does not 
rely on psychology; yet I believe it should be normatively 
independent from decision theory in the results it produces, 
as I will explain later.
By contrast with Pettit, Dreier addresses the problem 
of individuation more frontally. Hoping to save moderate 
Humeanism from the emptiness problem, he provides an 
alternative solution to it. He first explains why Broome’s 
position is intuitively unappealing and argues that by impos-
ing intrinsic constraints on preferences it is overkill: it makes 
rationality too constraining, although Dreier believes that 
Maurice can rationally hold his preferences between R, H 
and M as long as he has reasons for it:
We may ask Maurice, do you prefer hiking to staying 
home because you care about the relation the choice 
of hiking bears to the particular alternative of staying 
home? If he doesn’t - if, for example, he simply hadn’t 
noticed that his pairwise preferences among hiking, 
Rome, and home were intransitive, or if he did notice 
it but did not care - then after all his preferences are 
irrational. (ibid)
In other words, there is for Dreier a criterion that allows 
some Maurice-like preferences while avoiding the emptiness 
problem. And this criterion should assess whether Maurice’s 
preferences are supported by another class of preferences. 
Indeed, if Maurice could imagine the choice between “Home 
when offered to go to Rome” and “Mountaineering”, and 
that he did prefer the former over the latter (so that M < Hr), 
it would be sufficient to justify Maurice’s rationality. This 
preference is akin to a thought experiment, as it cannot hap-
pen in real-life, but for Dreier it does provide a necessary 
and sufficient justification to Maurice’s rationality. This is 
Maurice’s specific contextual desires to the relation between 
home and mountaineering that makes the choice apparently 
cyclical but in fact rational: staying home holds specific 
properties when paired to mountaineering. Although I agree 
with Dreier’s intuition that Broome’s solution is overcon-
straining, I think this new consistency condition is corre-
lated with a rational justification, but neither necessary nor 
sufficient. Indeed, successfully showing that M < Hr is not 
necessary nor sufficient to justify the rationality the initial 
cycle of choices {H < M < R < H}. To see this consider a 
case where Mauricette exhibits similar choices between H, 
R, and M, only this time, the feature that makes her choose 
this way is the special relationship between Rome and stay-
ing home, rather than that between mountaineering and stay-
ing home. Indeed, she chooses mountaineering over staying 
home as she loves skiing, Rome over mountaineering as she 
loves the city, but staying home over going to Rome because 
going to Italy when she knows she could have stayed home 
makes her home sick: she is very sensitive to the historical 
rivalry between Italy and her home country. Again, Mauri-
cette allegedly has the same cyclical preferences as Mau-
rice: R < H < M < R. Yet Dreier’s justification for Maurice’s 
preferences doesn’t hold for Mauricette: nothing in this 
new story suggests that M < Hr: until proven otherwise, it 
seems that Mauricette prefers skiing to staying home here. 
Therefore, there are cases where it is not true that M < Hr, 
yet Mauricette’s preferences still seem intuitively justified. 
Consequently, Dreier’s solution does not identify in a neces-
sary way the allegedly justifying consistency condition that 
saves the chooser’s rationality.
A second remark about Dreier’s claims: it is not sufficient 
that M < Hr for it to justify the initial cycle either. Consider 
Alanis that goes by the exact same description as Mauri-
cette, only this time she also happen to prefer  Hr to M, if 
asked about it: she does love skiing, but not as much as she 
enjoys the relief of not being homesick in Rome. Alanis 
thus passes Dreier’s test as M < Hr. Is it a sufficient justifi-
cation to Alanis rationality? Not intuitively, as by Dreier’s 
intuition we should add that  Hr < M in order to make this 
justification proper: what truly motivates and rationalizes 
Alanis cycle by Dreier’s view should have been the pecu-
liarity of the contextual desires between Rome and staying 
home. About both of these points, Dreier could amend his 
criterion and argue that all of these impractical relational 
preferences should be tested, and that we would eventually 
find out that  (Hr < H) but this condition becomes much more 
constraining: an agent should now check all of the potential 
relational (or alternative-dependent) preferences she has in 
order to claim her rationality. Moreover, it fails to explain 
cleanly what the relevant objects of choice are, and why such 
preferences occur. Finally, one can interpret Dreier’s strategy 
as saving the moderate Humean view by expecting agents 
to make even more pairwise comparisons than before. If we 
treat Maurice’s case (at least partially) as a philosophical 
disagreement between Maurice and the experimenter, this 
strategy boils down to shifting the burden of proof from the 
experimenter to Maurice: ex ante, on which ground can the 
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experimenter refuse Maurice’s individuation? On the ground 
that this individuation is comes from abstract impractical 
preferences that justify it. In my view, accepting this shift 
of burden is implausible, especially in richer choice situa-
tions. Should Maurice always evaluate impractical pairs of 
alternatives before settling on an individuation? All in all, 
my point is that considering preferences over impractical 
thought experiments doesn’t rigorously justify the agent’s 
rationality, although it may sometimes be evidence of it. 
In my view, only a theory that indicates which objects are 
relevant to the agent choice and how she represents these 
objects would be satisfactory. Such a theory would have the 
merit of not being ad hoc by justifying the agent’s rational-
ity ex post, and would rather explain how such peculiar yet 
rational preferences arise.
2  Relevant Representations
2.1  The Relevance Claim About Decision‑Theoretic 
Representations
The reader should first note that throughout the essay I will 
use interchangeably the words representation and descrip-
tion by convenience. Both terms are used in the (voluntarily 
general and intuitive) sense of some formalized attempts 
to portray the features of an actual situation of choice. The 
only important distinction here is between description and 
redescription, where the latter is only strictly defined as rein-
dividuation of outcomes (cf above).
To theorize decision making, decision theory introduces 
primitive objects such as consequences, preferences and 
states of the world, and builds decision models on them. In 
Savage’s framework for instance, actions are defined as map-
pings from states to consequences; where the states “must 
leave no relevant aspect undescribed” (Savage 1954, p. 9) 
so that all the features of the consequences that the decision 
maker cares about are represented. As an example, if I must 
choose between going to an Italian restaurant and staying 
home, I must include in my description of the decision prob-
lem that the Italian restaurant may or may not serve tiramisu, 
may or may not be closed, etc. insofar as I care about these 
features. This requirement exists both for technical and intui-
tive1 reasons: in order to make accurate predictions and pre-
scriptions, a theory of decision making must capture all that 
is likely to affect the satisfaction of the agent’s ends.
I believe that this requirement has an important implica-
tion on the way we deal with decision problems in deci-
sion theory. In fact, when given the description of a decision 
problem, we are also given a key assumption: the descrip-
tion is maximally relevant for the choice problem, as noth-
ing more is needed (and available to the decision theorist/
adviser) in order to make a decision. I will refer to this claim 
as the relevance claim. The relevance claim thus consists 
in assuming that every consequence, state, and option the 
agent cares about to make up her mind is is already included 
in the description of the decision problem. Intuitively, rel-
evance thus has a similar object as a theoretical hypothesis,2 
that supposes the descriptive validity of a representation. 
To make this claim intuitive, consider a standard textbook 
example: you are to choose between different monetary 
bets contingent on the color of a ball drawn from an urn. 
The example here identifies the outcome space to lotteries 
of monetary payoffs. As it is, this description (that can be 
represented in a state-consequence matrix) presupposes that 
nothing relevant is left aside: in particular, all you care about 
is the financial outcome of each bet, and not, say, the esthetic 
pleasure you get from the color of the ball. Since if you did 
care about the color of the ball for its own sake, this should 
be included in the description of the consequences. Conse-
quently, every representation of a decision problem has an 
attached implicit claim: that it is maximally specific as to 
what the agent cares about that may be related to the choice 
problem.3 At least, this claim best explains the practice of 
decision theorist in the way the lay out their theory.
I will give two additional arguments that support this 
claim. First, if the description of the decision problem was 
not judged relevant, there would be no point in acting based 
on that description; I believe that it would in fact undermine 
the whole normative enterprise of decision theory. How can 
you possibly prescribe anything if you cannot trust some 
description of the problem that you are trying to solve? This 
is why, in decision theory textbooks, once a description of 
1 To see more on Savage’s technical reasons see Bradley (2016, p. 9, 
Savage’s Theory.
2 As defined by Giere (1983), as an assumption about the relation-
ship between a model and the real world. This comparison to Giere 
should only be understood as an intuitive analogy, as I am not neces-
sarily committed to Giere’s account of modelling here.
3 Before defending this claim any further, I want to explain what I 
mean by maximally specific. Although we rarely think of deci-
sion representations this way, we hold the intuition that if the agent 
knew some relevant objects to be excluded of the representation, we 
should surely have them included too before making any normative 
considerations about the case. This suggest that there is a “more rel-
evant” relation of order between representations, although it may be 
incomplete. Is there such a thing as a maximally relevant set? We 
know there is, as the set of all possible objects that may be included 
in the representation is (weakly) more relevant than any of its subsets. 
This doesn’t mean that this maximal representation is the one we are 
after, as this superset may have many subsets that are themselves as 
relevant as this superset although they contain less objects. This sub-
sets simply excluded irrelevant objects from the representation. All of 
these I will call maximally specific representations. For a more intui-
tive grasp on this, see the notion of excessive representation in the 
next subsection.
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the decision problem is given, the theory usually gives a 
clear-cut assessment of the rational attitudes and decisions 
so that every relevant aspects of the problem are given. This 
assumption of relevance is what gives normative substance 
to decision theory as we know it. If a theory aims at evaluat-
ing the consistency of a set of choices, it has to assume an 
underlying set of attitudes to the world, AND suppose that 
these attitudes capture all that is relevant to the decision 
from the decision maker’s perspective.
Second, if the representation is not supposed to be rel-
evant, then the inconsistencies could very well come from 
the incorrectness of the representation itself: an agent (or an 
observer) could systematically blame the representation and 
save the agent’s reasoning.
2.2  Implication of the Relevance Claim for Broome’s 
Argument and Potential Objections
If we now grant the correctness of the relevance claim and 
of its underlying idea of maximal relevance, then Mau-
rice’s example can be interpreted in a quite different way 
from Broome’s. The difficulty around Maurice’s case lies 
in the fact that he might be recklessly using reindividua-
tion to rationalize his attitudes, which may make the tran-
sitivity principle vacuous. However, we can now object 
that decision theory (as we know it) does not allow nor 
disallow reindividuation and thus reckless rationalization 
of agent’s attitudes, but often has nothing to say about 
it: normative interpretations of representation theorems 
just tell you how to be consistent based on one given rep-
resentation that is deemed relevant. Here Maurice gives 
two descriptions that are in turn claimed to be maximally 
relevant: one where considerations of awkwardness are 
excluded is ({R, M, H}) and one where they are included 
within the alternatives ({R, M,  Hr,  Hm}). But Maurice can-
not simultaneously argue that both of them are maximally 
specific. At most, he could say that exactly one is maxi-
mally relevant, but it is not up to decision theory to decide 
which. Moreover, the logically impossible fact that both 
descriptions may be maximally relevant does not jeopard-
ize transitivity and decision theory as we know it, simply 
because decision theory does not have anything to say 
about the choice of the relevant description, the condi-
tions under which a description is relevant, or whether the 
agent should hold simultaneously consistent representa-
tions. From the first representation, decision theory will 
say that if it does capture everything Maurice cares about, 
then Maurice has intransitive and thus irrational prefer-
ences. And the theory will allow Maurice’s attitudes and 
choice in the second representation; it is however, a dif-
ferent Maurice, in a different decision problem that the 
theory is assessing.
Moderate Humeanism, as Broome defines it, is a prin-
ciple that applies to decision theoretic objects: preferences 
and outcomes. Consequently, this is a claim made at the 
level of decision theory: given a representation of the deci-
sion problem, moderate humeanism demands that the only 
constraints be consistency ones. Since Broome’s objection 
regards reindividuation strategies and therefore choices of 
representations, it does not affect moderate Humeanism, 
since as Decision theory, moderate Humeanism has noth-
ing to say about these. The upshot for Broome’s argument 
is that step (vi) (moderate Humeanism rejects both of the 
constraining strategies established by Broome) is false: mod-
erate Humeanism does not allow nor disallow to constrain 
reindividuation strategies. It thus does not make the theory 
empty, nor collapses into Extreme Humeanism. In a way, 
Broome’s argument can be seen as category mistake, as it 
expects standard decision theory and moderate humeanism 
to constrain strategies that go beyond their scope.
I will now consider a series of objections against my 
view and attempt to defuse them. First, it could well be 
argued that decision theory should have something to say 
about relevance and the way agents represent their decision 
problems. But this would be a new field of investigation 
for decision theory, that would normatively question mod-
els of models, ie how we should model our representations 
of the world. My views can be summarized in the diagram 
page 11. Two phases of the process of decision making can 
be distinguished. The first one which is representational, 
and the second one about the assessment and resolution of 
the decision problem given a particular representation. The 
second process has nothing to say about the first and vice-
versa. One may argue that since standard decision theory 
normatively engage with people’s attitudes prima facie, it 
does have something to say about what is relevant and what 
is not. I believe that this objection is ungrounded. We do 
want to separate what the agent or modeller of the decision 
problem says to be relevant about it, from what standard 
decision theory prescribes doing and not doing. Why? Pre-
cisely because we want to be able to explain, understand 
and justify what is a bad decision given a correctly repre-
sented decision problem. This would not be possible if both 
problems were addressed simultaneously: either the repre-
sentation could systematically be blamed, or worse, a bad 
representation and a bad decision theory could be licensed. 
To illustrate this point, consider a case of framing effect such 
as the Asian disease case. A disease is expected to kill 600 
people. Subjects are being asked to make choices between 
two pairs of policies:
• First offer:
  Program A: “200 people will be saved”
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  Program B: “there is a 1/3 probability that 600 people 
will be saved, and a 2/3 probability that no people will 
be saved”
• Second offer:
  Program C: “400 people will die”
  Program D: “there is a 1/3 probability that nobody will 
die, and a 2/3 probability that 600 people will die”
In practice, people usually prefer A to B and D to C (Tver-
sky and Kahneman 1981). Traditionally, the theory interpret 
these results as inconsistent, as programs A and C and B and 
B are respectively deemed identical, if we only consider the 
number of deaths and the probabilities. However, in order to 
claim that agents are inconsistent, we must suppose that the 
two descriptions represent the same (or equivalent) decision 
problems. In particular, can we say that agents are inconsist-
ent if “not die” and “be saved” are not equivalent descrip-
tions? Is it the case that the subject only cares about deaths 
and lives as consequences?
I thus suggest that the process of decision theory and 
advising be separated in two independent fields (see Dia-
gram 1): Starting from a description of the agents’ attitudes 
about the real world decision problem in non decision theo-
retic language (in a logical language or one of philosophy of 
action for instance), a theory of representation would then 
prescribe how to describe the problem in decision (set-)
theoretic terms and which of the possible representations 
are admissible ones. Only then can standard decision theory 
be applied to the selected representation. With these two 
frameworks in mind, it seems that the scope of Broome’s 
argument about how to constrain reindividuation and how to 
solve the emptiness problem covers only the first step of the 
decision making process, namely determining the relevant 
representation(s) of a decision problem, and more impor-
tantly the licensed methods to reach such a description.
A second potential objection can be aimed at this division 
of labor between the relevance of the representation and and 
the rationality of the decision making. One could argue that 
in many cases, decision theory does tell you about what is 
relevant or not for the decision. Consider for instance the 
textbook urn case given earlier: suppose the agent also cares 
about the room temperature when she draws the ball, as she 
prefers to be warm rather than to be cold. However, the room 
temperature is always the same, so that the outcomes only 
differ in the color of the drawn ball. Then indeed, decision 
theory tells you that the temperature of the room should not 
play a role in the agent’s decision, that it is not relevant in 
some sense. Although normative principles of decision the-
ory yield some constraint on the representation, the nature of 
the constraint is structurally different from the one Broome 
has in mind. In order to make this point clear, I will first 
refine the notion of representational relevance.
A description of a decision problem can be bad for several 
reasons. It may be bad because it insufficiently or illogically 
describes reality (which may be the world, or the agent’s 
relation to the world). The description can also be bad 
because it is excessive (as in the room temperature case). 
Now, when we say that the representation should capture 
everything that is relevant (and possibly more), we mean 
that descriptions should be sufficiently exhaustive. But it 
can be the case that they be logically inconsistent, or exces-
sively precise. When a representation of a decision problem 
is excessive or logically inconsistent, then indeed, decision 
theory may show that it is the case. But precisely because 
its principles are consistency principles, it will never tell 
you that the representation is missing something that is rel-
evant to the agent (in the sense that the agent cares about 
this thing). We can thus refine the previous framework, by 
Diagram 1  Logical steps of the proposed framework of representation of decision problems and subsequent decision making
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saying that representation theory should establish which set 
theoretic descriptions are sufficiently accurate, although they 
may be excessively or inconsistently so; and decision theory 
may sometimes tell you which features are superfluous for 
decisions (but I am not sure that it always does.). And again 
what would happen if we mixed the two fields? We would 
not be able to check whether the relevance principle stands. 
Imagine a DM who knows about what matters to him, but is 
mistaken in his subsequent deliberation. A theory of deci-
sion-making that would simultaneously assess objective and 
subjective relevance, would not be able to identify the source 
of mistake. Second, the opposite problem of identification 
can occur if the agent is not rationally blameworthy but ini-
tially misrepresented the decision problem.
2.3  Is Moderate Humeanism Any Safer Under This 
View Than Under Broome’s?
A more general objection has been raised about the status 
of moderate humeanism and the emptiness problem before 
representation this time. If I understand the argument cor-
rectly, it objects that although Humeanism may be safe at 
the decision theoretic level, it may not be at the pre-decision 
theoretic one: what guarantees that all preferences should 
be acceptable as long as they are consistent, and so before 
representation? As I understand the Humean versus anti-
Humean debate, the main bone of contention concerns the 
normative legitimacy of practical reason. Consequently I 
will leave aside positions about moral or legal normativity. 
In particular, the moral status of ends, means, and desires 
are off the scope here. The relevant part of the objection is 
whether all preferences should be rationally acceptable, even 
before representation, as long as they cohere. This paper 
does not address the worry. The reader might thus wonder 
how my response to Broome solves the problem for moder-
ate Humeanism here. In this paper, my hopes were twofold. 
First, to argue that Broome’s ambition fails, as he does not 
successfully show that the formal decision theoretic appara-
tus suffices to prove moderate humeanism wrong. Second, 
I advocated the establishment of an independent upstream 
theory, that would ask the normative and more semantic 
question of representation before decision. True, this does 
not prevent a general anti Humean argument to go through at 
this upstream level. But I would not have hoped to achieve so 
much in one paper. Yet it is very likely that some primitive 
objects of an adequate theory of representation will not all 
be identical to Savage’s. The notions of care about objects 
of deliberation, and of relevant features for choice cannot 
be captured by the theory so far, unlike (arguably) attitudes 
of desire and belief. Consequently, care and relevance in 
decision making should be reduced to (or introduced as) at 
least some new primitive attitude. And I suspect that such 
considerations will only be settled once the question of rep-
resentation will be.
2.4  Broome’s Argument Within Jeffrey’s Decision 
Theory
In what follows, I want to consider here a more technical 
objection. So far my claims as well as Broome’s were for-
mulated within the standard Savage framework of decision 
theory. The present objection involves Jeffrey’s theory of 
decision making, which I will describe now. As explained 
above, Savage’s theory shapes decision making along three 
intuitive dimensions: states, beliefs and desires. This repre-
sentation strategy is double edged, as although it offers nice 
categories of decision making, it also constrains the way 
a real life decision can be represented. In particular, one 
should be able to strictly distinguish the object of beliefs 
(states), of desires (outcomes), and of means to bring about 
these outcomes (options). The theory implies further that 
the desirability of an outcome ought to be independent from 
the state of the world where it occurs (state neutrality), as 
well as from the subjective probability state in which they 
occur. Finally, the options themselves should not impact the 
probability of the various states of the world involved in 
the decision problem. By contrast with Savage’s, Jeffrey’s 
theory is puzzlingly flexible, as it presupposes neither these 
conceptual categories of decision making nor the constraints 
that go with them. Objects of desires, beliefs, and choices 
are all propositions, and thus possibly interdependent for 
Jeffrey. As an example, the fact that it rains tomorrow can 
simultaneously be an object of desire and belief for Jeffrey, 
but not for Savage. This structural flexibility allows deci-
sion theorists to model real-world decision without any 
reformatting of the options, states and consequences, but 
rather as the decision maker perceives them. This leads us 
to the second major virtue of Jeffrey’s theory, namely that it 
can afford describing the various acts, options, and states in 
a dependent or independent way, such that the theory will 
always prescribe the same choices. Unlike Savage’s theory 
that only allows for independently described objects, Jef-
frey’s theory is partition invariant: any description of the 
decision problem through any partition of the state space 
will yield the same result. This property is best understood 
formally through the partition of a proposition p: {pi} is a set 
of mutually incompatible but jointly exhaustive sub-propo-
sitions by which proposition p can be realised. p = Ui{pi} 
and if the agent’s preferences respect Jeffrey’s conditions 
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of rationality, they can be represented through a desirability 
function Des(p), very similar to expected utility but applied 
to any p ∶ Des(p) = ∑iDes(pi).P(pi�p) . Given this result, 
the partition invariance property is guaranteed by the fact 
that an agent respecting Jeffrey’s axioms of preferences will 
assign the same desirability to p, regardless of the partition 
{pi} in the above formula. Partition invariance is norma-
tively attractive (see for instance Joyce 1999), as “it ensures 
that various representations of the same decision problem 
yield solutions that agree.” (Weirich 2016).
How does it relate to the problem of individuation and 
my present claims? Since I advocate a theory of repre-
sentation on the ground that decision theory doesn’t say 
anything about it, and that rational decisions are sensi-
tive to these representations, one could object that this 
concern only applies to Savage’s theory. Moreover, since 
Jeffrey’s theory is partition invariant, shouldn’t it yield 
the same choice in the two Maurice’s cases? To put it 
differently, a Jeffrey agent would allegedly be consistent 
across representations, so why would the relevance claim 
that I defend still be substantial? Note first that if it were 
the case, my answer to Broome wouldn’t go through in 
this alternative framework, all the more so as Broome’s 
worry would itself be defused at once: according to this 
objection, either Maurice is respecting Jeffrey’s axioms 
and chooses consistently across the board, in which case 
Humeanism is safe, or he doesn’t and is rationally blame-
worthy, and Humeanism is safe too. To put it differently, 
this objection suggests that the emptiness problem doesn’t 
exist in Jeffrey’s framework, as reindividuation shouldn’t 
change anything about Maurice’s choice.
To assess this challenge, let’s see how Maurice’s situ-
ation can be translated in Jeffrey’s framework. In the ini-
tial situation, Maurice also exhibits cyclical preferences 
with respect to the three propositions “going to Rome”, 
“going mountaineering” and “staying home” (respectively 
R, M, H). In the second, redescribed situation, Maurice 
has the following preferences: H&notC > R > M > H&C; 
where C is the proposition “looking like a coward”. So 
far, the DT descriptions looks very similar to Savage’s. 
But there is more to it: since Jeffrey’s objects of prefer-
ences are propositions, they entertain logical relations with 
one another. One way to see the structure of propositional 
relations in Jeffrey is through the desirability equation 
mentioned above: if {pi} is a partition of proposition p, 
the desirability of p is then given by the following for-
mula, that gives a weighted average of p’s desirability: 
Des(p) =
∑
iDes(pi).P(pi�p) . Applied to Maurice, if we 
take {H&C, H&notC} to be such a partition of H, and p 
to be H: 
Des(H) = Des(H& notC).P(notC/H) + Des(H& C).P(C/H);
this is simply due to the fact that P(H& notC/H) = P(notC/H).
Therefore, the desirability of H exists, and is defined 
as some weighted average of the desirability of the finer 
propositions that capture the cowardice consideration. 
Consequently, Jeffrey’s framework imposes that H and C 
be such that H&notC > H > H&C. The difference of desir-
ability between H&notC and H will be more or less sig-
nificant, depending on the probabilities of C and notC, 
and this will also impact the preference between R and H, 
and R and M.
Now that the translation in Jeffrey’s term is established, 
what does it say about Maurice’s rationality? Well, noth-
ing. As the story told in Savage’s case would go exactly 
the same way: Maurice is implicitly asked about H, C and 
R, and then argues that H didn’t actually capture accu-
rately the choice he was facing, so that what he actually 
evaluated was H&C and H&notC. As before Maurice 
cares about more than the mere destination. If the choice 
is explicitly made by another agent in propositionalized 
term, one could say that Maurice ought to exactly under-
stand the offer at its face value, ie that by “staying home” 
nothing more is meant than staying home, whether it 
implies looking like a coward or not. If he did understand 
it this way he would be expected to choose in a transitive 
way, would argue the objector. However, I don’t think that 
this requirement of understanding the offered choice at 
its face value is a requirement of rationality: it may be a 
semantic requirement, a requirement of understanding and 
cognitive ability, but it is not what anyone would expect 
from a rational agent. I think one could imagine a rational 
agent that needs to be specified exactly the scope of the 
offered alternatives anytime she is about to make a choice. 
Granted it would be a weird individual, but intuitively not 
an irrational one. Therefore, moderate Humeanism is not 
concerned with these kinds of requirements, as they are 
not rationality requirements, and again I don’t think that 
Broome’s argument follows through. This doesn’t mean 
that nothing needs to be done, as a theory of representation 
would be just as useful in Jeffrey’s case. As the objection 
only made sense if the offered was made in propositional 
term by another agent; but if the story only is about Mau-
rice considering his alternatives and choosing, then the 
question of how to represent properly the alternatives he 
is facing comes back as powerfully as before. And then, 
the issue is not linguistic, but representational: based on 
which rules should Maurice include specific features of 
the alternatives in his decision problem in order to apply 
decision theory to it?
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3  Conclusion
In what precedes, I reconstructed Broome’s argument 
against moderate Humeanism and show that decision the-
ory as we know it has nothing to say about about the rel-
evance of the representation of a decision problem. Conse-
quently, Broome’s argument about the emptiness problem 
and licensed reindividuation only regards the methods of 
choice of representations. Since moderate Humeanism as 
we defined it only regards the way decision theory (ie the 
second step of the normative evaluation) is done, it is not 
undermined by Broome’s argument. However, the core of 
his argument may still very much apply to a new area of 
research, that may investigate what a relevant representa-
tion should look like.
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